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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the drivers of business funded and performed R&D in a panel of 14 OECD 
countries since 1981. More specifically, we investigate the effects of public R&D related policies and 
wage formation. Following Pesaran (Econometrica, 2006) and Kapetanios et al. (Journal of 
Econometrics, 2011), our empirical strategy allows for cross-sectionally correlated error terms due 
to the presence of unobserved common factors, which are potentially non-stationary. We find that 
tax incentives are effective. Public funding (subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also be 
effective if subsidies are not too low, neither too high. R&D performed within the government sector 
and within institutions of higher education is basically neutral with respect to business R&D. We find 
no evidence for crowding out, nor for complementarity. The higher education sector may, however, 
indirectly be of great significance. Our results reveal human capital accumulation at the tertiary level 
as a key driver of business R&D in the OECD during the last decades. As to the impact of wage 
formation, using an indicator for wage pres- sure developed by Blanchard (Economic Policy, 2006), 
we find that wage moderation may contribute to innovation, but only in fairly closed economies and 
in economies with flexible labour markets. In highly open economies and economies with rigid 
labour markets rather the opposite holds. In these economies high wage pressure may enhance 
creative destruction and force firms to innovate as a competitive strategy. Our results show that a 
careful treatment of the properties of the data is crucial. 
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1 Introduction
Ageing and rising pressure on the welfare state force all OECD countries to develop effective
employment and growth policies. When it comes to long-run growth, both the theoretical
and empirical literature recognize investment in research and development (R&D) as a major
factor (see Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman,
and Hoffmaister, 2009). Numerous studies have therefore investigated the determinants of
business investment in R&D in many countries, both at the micro and the macro level.
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (1997, 2003) were the first to provide an explanation at the
macro level in a panel of 17 OECD countries. In their seminal paper, they paid particular
attention to the role of public policies organized to stimulate private R&D investment i.e.
tax incentives, public funding of R&D projects in the business sector, expenditures on R&D
within the government sector and R&D spending in institutions of higher education.
Our research is inspired by two gaps in the empirical macro literature on the drivers of
business R&D. A first one relates to the impact of wage formation. Today, OECD countries
are not only called upon to develop effective growth policies, but also to create jobs and to
raise employment rates. To reach this goal, many countries adopt outspoken wage moderation
policies. Interestingly, these policies also affect incentives and available resources for firms to
innovate and invest in R&D. On the employer side, it is often argued that wage moderation is
an important factor to maintain firm profitability, which is a key condition for investment in
R&D. Several researchers have, however, argued that an excessive focus on wage moderation
may kill incentives to innovate (e.g. Kleinknecht, 1998). Wage moderation may for exam-
ple increase the survival probability of the least innovative firms and retard the process of
creative destruction. Weighing on the purchasing power of households, outspoken wage mod-
eration may also lead to lower demand-driven innovations as demand for new products and
services falls. Conversely, high wage pressure may force firms to innovate as a key element in
their competitive strategy. To the best of our knowledge, despite its theoretical importance,
rigorous cross-country empirical work on these conflicting hypotheses has never been done.
A second gap in the existing empirical macro literature on the determinants of R&D in-
vestment is methodological. A key characteristic of new technology and knowledge is that
they may spill over to other firms and countries, so that all may benefit from an improve-
ment in the world level of technology, although not necessarily to the same extent (Coe,
Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009; Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015). Eberhardt,
Helmers, and Strauss (2013) have shown that these spillovers affect firms’ private returns
to R&D and therefore business R&D investment. A crucial econometric issue, however, fol-
lows from the fact that the world level of technology and knowledge is largely unobserved.
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Technology spillovers will then manifest themselves in standard panel R&D regressions as
cross-sectional dependence in the error terms, induced by an unobserved common factor.
Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (1997, 2003) and subsequent macro research (e.g. Falk, 2006;
Westmore, 2014) have neglected this issue. If omitted common factors are correlated with
the included explanatory variables, estimated parameters will be biased and inconsistent.
Even worse, when unobserved common factors are non-stationary, standard estimators yield
spurious results.
Our contribution in this paper is to study the determinants of business investment in
R&D in 14 OECD countries in the period 1981-2012, with a special focus on the role of wage
formation and by adopting an empirical strategy that deals with cross-sectionally correlated
error terms due to the presence of unobserved common factors. Figure 1 shows the data. To be
precise, they include the expenditures on R&D performed and financed by the business sector.
They are expressed in real per capita terms and in 2010 PPP dollars. Further in this paper
we characterize this variable as BERD, briefly defined as business R&D investment. Huge
cross-country differences stand out, both in the level and in the evolution of R&D, making an
empirical analysis highly relevant. To quantify wage formation, we follow Blanchard (2006)
and use insights from growth theory. The approach is to compare actual (growth of) real
wages with the so-called ’warranted’ real wage (growth). The latter is determined by the rate
of Harrod-neutral technical progress. In growth theory, this is the rate of real wage growth
consistent with stable employment along a balanced growth path. We will speak of high
wage pressure when actual real wage growth is higher than the rate of technical progress.
A positive and increasing wage gap will then arise. We speak of wage moderation when
actual real wage growth is lower than the rate of technical progress. The wage gap then
declines and may turn negative. Next to the role of wage pressure, we also test the impact
of public policies organized to stimulate business R&D investment, in line with Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe (2003). To estimate our model, we use the common correlated effects
pooled (CCEP) estimator of Pesaran (2006). This estimator controls for unobserved common
factors by adding cross-sectional averages of the data. As shown by Kapetanios, Pesaran, and
Yamagata (2011), this approach is also valid in a non-stationary panel context.
Our main findings are the following. First of all, we learn from our results that a careful
treatment of the properties of the data is crucial. The empirical analysis reveals significant
cross-sectional correlation in levels and in first-differences for most variables. All variables
are also found to be non-stationary. For most variables the non-stationarity is induced by
an (unobserved) common factor. The use of the CCEP estimator is therefore highly justi-
fied. Second, the effects of wage pressure are significant but not uniform. We find that in
economies where firms face relatively little (foreign) competition and dispose of flexibility to
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adjust their employed labour force because employment protection legislation is soft, high
wage pressure has negative effects on business R&D investment. In open economies where
firms face sharp (foreign) competition and run their activities in a rather rigid and regulated
labour environment, however, the opposite seems to happen. In such economies - think of
many European economies - firms that do not innovate cannot survive when wage pressure
is high. Rising wages thus enhance creative destruction and force all firms to innovate as a
competitive strategy. Third, our empirical analysis reveals various ways in which governments
can effectively promote business R&D investment. We observe that both tax incentives and
public funding (subsidization) of R&D projects in the business sector can work, if chosen
carefully. This condition applies in particular to public funding. For this policy instrument,
we confirm an earlier finding of Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) that the relationship
between subsidization and business R&D investment is inverted U-shaped. That is, subsidies
encourage private firms to raise their own R&D spending if these subsidies are not too low
neither too high. The optimal subsidization rate (at the macro level) may be somewhere
between 6 % and 10 %. The results also show that the available stock of high-skilled human
capital is an important driver of business R&D investment implying that governments should
invest in schooling in order to increase the percentage of the population with a higher degree.
Finally, we find that R&D investment within the government sector and within universities
will also have positive effects on aggregate R&D spending. Most of our results predict a
one-to-one effect from higher spending within the public sector to aggregate R&D. In other
words, neither the idea that public R&D would crowd out private R&D spending, nor the
idea of complementarity between the two, find support in our results.
Our focus on aggregate business R&D investment in this paper is not common in the lit-
erature. In comparative perspective, many more studies have investigated R&D expenditures
at the firm or the industry level, see e.g. the surveys in David, Hall, and Toole (2000) and
Becker (2015). Yet, there are very good reasons why an analysis of macroeconomic data is
important. A first one relates to the indirect effects or externalities of policies. For example,
if individual firms benefit from R&D investment subsidies, this may boost their innovation
activity. At the same time, however, also other firms may be affected. Competing firms may
suffer because of the advantage given to a direct competitor. Due to falling rates of return
they may reduce their R&D investment. On the other hand, downstream customers in the
supply chain may benefit from knowledge spillovers induced by the innovating firm. They
may raise their R&D investment. Similar externalities can occur between industries (Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003). The potential presence of these external effects makes the case
for an empirical analysis at the macro level. A second reason follows from the observation
that (firms in) different industries may react differently to changes in the drivers of R&D,
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for example because market environment and institutions are different. In that sense, the
response of R&D investment to rising wage pressure may be different in manufacturing sec-
tors than in services. For policy makers it will be highly interesting also to know what the
response is at the aggregate level.
Figure 1: Business financed and performed R&D expenditures (BERD) in 14 OECD
countries (real per capita, 2010 PPP dollars)
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Note: further details and data sources are described in Appendix C
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief survey of
the literature on public policy instruments to encourage business R&D investment, and on
their effects. This section also reviews the conflicting hypotheses regarding the influence of
wage formation on innovation. Section 3 discusses important properties of the data, sets out
the empirical model and discusses the econometric methodology. In Section 4 we report our
estimation results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Drivers of business R&D intensity: literature
Boosting R&D intensity is one of the top priorities of OECD countries today. The Europe 2020
targets include that 3% of EU GDP has to be invested in R&D and innovation (public and
private combined) by 2020. To stimulate private R&D intensity, governments have different
instruments at their disposal. These instruments are used to offset market failure in the
allocation of resources to long-term and risky investment, which are key characteristics of
R&D investment. As a result, private investment in R&D is mostly lower than socially
optimal, thus justifying government support.
Section 2.1 discusses existing public policy instruments and some of the empirical evidence
on their impact. In Section 2.2. we review the literature regarding the effects of wage forma-
tion and some underlying labour market characteristics on R&D investment and innovation.
Various countries have institutionalized wage moderation or wage control mechanisms in the
second half of the 1980s or early 1990s. Other countries have decentralized wage bargain-
ing and introduced legislation to reduce union power, also contributing to wage moderation.
While most will agree that these policies have positive effects on employment and compet-
itiveness, at least in the short run, their possible long-run effects on a country’s innovative
capacity occur much less clear. In our discussion of the arguments for and against wage mod-
eration, we also pay attention to the potential impact of the institutional environment within
which wage formation takes place. We end with a brief explanation of the role of product
market characteristics.
2.1 Public policy instruments
Traditionally, R&D policy can be subdivided in direct support (such as public sector R&D
and direct R&D subsidies) and indirect support (such as R&D tax incentives). In addition,
governments may also provide support for the university research system and the formation
of high-skilled human capital as for formal R&D cooperation between institutions. In this
section, we point at existing, mostly empirical, evidence on the impact of policy support
measures on private R&D expenditures.
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Public sector R&D and government funding of R&D in the business sector
Among the most frequently used public policy instruments to support R&D are public sector
R&D and government funding of private investment in R&D. The former refers to direct
R&D expenditures by public research institutions (intramural) and universities. The latter
may either take the form of grants or subsidies, where the results of the R&D belong to the
private performer, or it may concern funding aimed at the procurement of R&D, where the
results belong to a recipient that is not necessarily the performer. An important question in
the literature is whether these instruments are effective tools to stimulate private investment
in R&D, or not. Effects may be positive when public sector involvement reduces the cost
and risk of research for the industry. One way to achieve this is by conducting basic or
fundamental research (where the wedge between private and social returns is probably the
highest) and by making its results publicly available. Effects may also be positive when
public resources lift potential cash constraints in private firms or provide a buffer when high
financial risk is involved. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), however, see three reasons
why one may question the effectiveness of public spending on R&D. As a worst case scenario,
public spending may even crowd out private R&D. First, government spending on R&D may
increase the demand for researchers, which may raise these researchers’ wages and make
private R&D investment more expensive. This potential source of crowding out is most
likely to occur if there is a shortage in the most decisive factor of the R&D process. That
is if high-skilled labour is scarce. Second, public sector money can act as a substitute to
private money. In other words, governments may execute or subsidize projects that would
have been implemented anyway such that the same investment is performed with public
instead of private money, without any increase in total R&D. Third, the allocation of funds
by the government generally occurs less efficiently than by market forces, thereby distorting
competition and resource allocation.
As to the empirical evidence on the effects of R&D in the public sector, Goolsbee (1998),
for the United States, finds evidence of crowding out of private funding through raising wages
of scientists and engineers. Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) (their Table III) report
results for a panel of 17 OECD countries that are consistent with this observation. According
to their findings, a one euro increase in R&D expenditures within the government sector tends
to imply a 0.38 euro decline in business expenditures in the long run. Although this supports
the hypothesis of crowding out, the net aggregate effect of intramural government R&D would
still seem to be positive. That is, crowding out is only partial. As to R&D expenditures in
universities, Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find an effect on private spending that
is basically zero, leaving an aggregate net effect of 1. Falk (2006), on the other hand, finds
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indications of a significant positive impact of R&D in the higher education sector on business
R&D.
When it comes to the effects of direct funding by the government of R&D in the private
sector, David, Hall, and Toole (2000) report that one third of available, mostly firm-level,
studies find substitution effects. Overall the authors conclude that the empirical literature
is inconclusive about the net impact of public R&D subsidies. Falk (2006) and Bassanini
and Ernst (2002) are also inconclusive or report negligible effects. By contrast, Guellec and
Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find that the net long-run impact of R&D subsidies on private R&D
investment is positive. A one euro increase in government funded R&D in the business sector
would induce an additional 0.7 euro of private spending. Lach (2002) also finds that public
R&D subsidies stimulate private R&D expenditures in the long run. So does most of the
more recent research. While Westmore (2014) finds positive effects of public R&D subsidies
in a macro panel of OECD countries, Becker (2015), in her survey, includes many micro based
studies that support the idea of additionality (see for instance Duguet, 2004; Carboni, 2011;
Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008; Hussinger, 2008; Cerulli and Poti,
2012; Oezcelik and Taymaz, 2008; Bloch and Graversen, 2012).
The effects of R&D subsidies need not be homogeneous, however. For instance, Jaumotte
and Pain (2005) show that at a firm level the positive effect of R&D subsidies is more pro-
nounced when firms are cash-constrained. In fact, there is broader empirical evidence that
public subsidies are more effective drivers of R&D in small (financially constrained) firms. In
the same spirit Czarnitzki and Ebersberger (2010) underscore the importance of aimed target-
ing of subsidies. These authors observe that in many cases most funding is awarded to larger
firms that would have performed the R&D even in the absence of the public subsidy. Some
studies also report heterogeneity in effects depending on the size of public subsidies. Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003), for instance, find an inverted U-shape, where the strongest
positive effects on private R&D can be observed for public subsidy rates of 4 − 11 %, while
rates that are too high (>20%) tend to generate negative (substitution) effects. Gorg and
Strobl (2007) confirm these findings. Becker (2015) concludes that this non-linear effect sug-
gests that it could be more effective to provide intermediate support levels to a larger number
of firms than a large amount of support to fewer firms.
R&D tax incentives
The policy mix aimed at stimulating business R&D and innovation has seen growing use
of R&D tax incentives. Such measures are indirect since the decision to use them, and the
decision on how to use them, remains with the company. They are thus considered to be more
market-oriented than for instance direct subsidies. Companies investing in R&D are eligible
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to claim tax reductions against their payable tax (Warda, 2001). As such, R&D tax incentives
reduce the marginal cost of R&D spending and are also more neutral (i.e. less distortive) than
direct R&D subsidies. In general, while direct subsidies are more targeted towards long-term
research, R&D tax schemes are more likely to encourage short-term applied research and
boost incremental innovation rather than radical breakthroughs (EC, 2003; OECD, 2014).
Fiscal incentives for R&D may take on various forms such as R&D tax credits, which are
present in countries such as France, Belgium and the UK (OECD, 2014; EC, 2003). These
tax credits are deducted from the corporate income tax and are applicable either to the
level of R&D expenditures or to the increase in these expenditures with respect to a given
base. Alternatively, some countries, such as Canada, Denmark and the UK, allow for the
immediate or accelerated depreciation of investment in machinery, equipment, and buildings
devoted to R&D activities (Warda, 2013; Falk, 2006). Finally, tax incentives do not only find
application in the corporate income tax, but may also apply to the personal income tax, as in
the Netherlands and Belgium, or to the value added tax (or other taxes such as consumption,
land or property) (OECD, 2014).
An often used indicator reflecting the overall generosity of R&D tax incentives in a country
is the so-called B-index (Warda, 2001). It is a composite index that is computed as the present
value of income before taxes necessary to cover the initial cost of R&D investment and to pay
the corporate income tax so that it becomes profitable to perform research activities (Warda,
2001). Algebraically, the B-index is equal to the after-tax cost of a one euro expenditure
on R&D divided by one minus the corporate income tax rate. The after-tax cost is the net
cost of investing in R&D, taking account of all available tax incentives (corporate income tax
rates, R&D tax credits and allowances, depreciation rates). The more favourable a country’s
tax treatment of R&D investment, the lower its B-index.
Hall and Van Reenen (2000) find that most studies in the pre 2000 literature show positive
effects of fiscal incentives on R&D expenditures. More recent research into the effectiveness
of tax credits is even more unanimous in concluding that there are positive R&D effects
(Becker, 2015). For instance, both Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002) and Guellec
and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) find significant negative coefficients on the B-index in their
regressions explaining business R&D expenditures. Bloom, Griffith, and Van Reenen (2002)
estimate that a 10% tax cut induced fall in the cost of R&D induces just over a 1% rise in
the level of R&D in the short run, and just under a 10% rise in R&D in the long run. That
is, they find a long-run elasticity of R&D with respect to the user cost of just below 1 in
absolute value. Long-run elasticities vary between modest estimates of −0.14 (Bernstein and
Mamuneas, 2005; Baghana and Mohnen, 2009) and strong ones of about −1.5 (as in Harris,
Li, and Trainor, 2009; Parisi and Sembenelli, 2003). Most studies find elasticities in between
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these extremes (Lokshin and Mohnen, 2012; Koga, 2003; Mulkay and Mairesse, 2013).
Knowledge spillovers from the university research system and the formation of
high-skilled human capital
Governments may resort to other than the traditional policy instruments to support pri-
vate R&D expenditures. Some recent studies indicate the relevance of knowledge spillovers
from university research to firms, enhancing technological opportunities and the productivity
of private R&D, for example through personal interactions, university spin-offs and consul-
tancy. Most empirical studies on this topic indeed find positive (geographically localized)
knowledge externalities from university research to private R&D (see for instance Jaffe, 1989;
Autant-Bernard, 2001; Karlsson and Andersson, 2009). Policies may thus aim to facilitate
and support the formation of regional clusters of university and private R&D activity to ex-
ploit agglomeration economies. An important role in this context is played by the (increased)
availability of high-skilled personnel trained by universities. Some studies do indeed find im-
portant positive R&D effects of high-skilled human capital resources1. Education policies and
human capital investment thus also have a role in increasing private R&D.
2.2 Wage formation, labour and product market characteristics and inno-
vation
The monitoring of wage formation is an important feature of many OECD countries’ economic
policy as it has a direct impact on employment and a country’s competitiveness. Expected
positive effects on employment generally underlie arguments in favour of wage moderation
(see e.g. Bovenberg, 1997). Lower wages may increase firm profitability, generating more
resources for investment. They may improve the competitiveness of domestic firms and raise
exports. And they may make production more labour intensive. It then comes as no surprise
that in many European countries wage moderation policies have become institutionalized.
Germany’s success is currently often taken as guiding inspiration (Heylen and Buyse, 2012).
An important additional element, especially from a long-run perspective, is the possible
impact of wage formation on a country’s innovative capacity. If high (excessive) wages re-
duce R&D investment, their negative effects on employment and competitiveness would be
multiplied. On the other hand, if wage pressure promotes innovation, negative effects on
competitiveness would be limited to the short run, whereas in the long run competitiveness
1Variables that are considered are the availability of highly qualified scientists and engineers (Adams,
Chiang, and Starkey, 2001; Adams, Chiang, and Jensen, 2003; Becker and Pain, 2008), the share of workers
with higher education in the total number of workers (Garcia and Mohnen, 2010), the share of the population
with tertiary education in the total working age population (Wang, 2010) and the years of formal schooling
(Kanwar and Evenson, 2003).
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and employment would rise. In the literature both theoretical cases have been made. The
first one goes as follows. If a focus on wage restraint is missing, rents from innovation may
be appropriated by unions through higher wage claims. This may reduce firms’ willingness
and resources to innovate. An early statement of this argument was the so-called hold-up
problem under incomplete contracts (Grout, 1984; Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen, 2003). In
more recent work, Ulph and Ulph (1994) confirm this argument in a right-to-manage model
where unions and firms bargain only over the wage. The main factor driving firms in their
innovation efforts in their model is the expected difference between the profits that the firm
can earn once it has successfully innovated and the profits that it would earn otherwise. In
this setup high (excessive) wages represent a ’tax’ that unions impose on the investment and
the success of the firm. Lower R&D investment would be the result. Conversely, a focus
on wage moderation would imply higher R&D. Other authors, however, have challenged this
expectation (see e.g. Kleinknecht, 1994, 1998; Kleinknecht and Naastepad, 2004). One of
their main arguments is that long-lasting wage moderation raises the survival probability of
low-productive firms and non-innovators, slowing down the process of creative destruction. In
a regime of wage increases and wage pressure, by contrast, the balance would shift and lack
of innovation would no longer - or much less - be an option. In the framework of Ulph and
Ulph (1994), this argument would imply that high wage pressure no longer reduces, but raises
the profit differential between innovating and not innovating. The explanation is the very
negative outcome (failure of the firm) in the non-innovating case. Intuitively, this idea raises
a number of interesting extensions. One would expect this positive effect of high wage pres-
sure to exist mainly in a very competitive environment and when firms lack the flexibility to
adjust their (expensive) labour force. What we have in mind are very open economies and/or
economies with highly deregulated product markets, but a very regulated labour market (e.g.
extensive employment protection legislation). It will be exactly in such an environment that
high wages and lack of innovation imply huge losses and the risk of bankruptcy. In these
economies innovation will be firms’ only possible competitive strategy.
Theory being inconclusive, what do we know about the impact of wage moderation on
innovation and R&D empirically? First of all, it must be said that existing empirical work
directly relating wage formation and innovation is very scarce. Most studies that analyse
the effect of labour markets on innovation focus on aspects of numerical flexibility, such as
the existence of flexible employment contracts, or functional flexibility such as the possi-
bility of outsourcing or temporary employment. For instance, Bassanini and Ernst (2002)
have estimated the impact of labour market regulation on an industry’s R&D intensity in a
cross-section of 18 manufacturing industries and 18 OECD countries. More recently, Mur-
phy, Siedschlag, and McQuinn (2012) examined the impact of the strictness of employment
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protection legislation on innovation intensity in the OECD. Univocal results are hard to find.
Observed effects depend on the system of industrial relations and the characteristics of indus-
tries. We know of only one study that has directly analyzed the impact of wage changes on
innovation. Pieroni and Pompei (2008) find, for a panel of Italian manufacturing industries,
that wage increases are positively related to the number of patents (their proxy for innova-
tion). However, the authors only look at absolute wages and do not include an adequate
measure of wage pressure (wage moderation) as we will do (See Section 3.1.1).
Next to the impact of labour market institutions, a growing number of researchers have
studied the role of product market characteristics (in particular product market competition)
on innovation. In a highly cited contribution, Aghion, Bloom, Griffith, and Howitt (2005) put
forward an inverted U-shaped relationship between the degree of competition and investment
in innovation. The argument goes as follows. When competition is low to begin with, the
economy is expected to consist of a higher fraction of sectors with ’neck-and-neck’ competing
firms. Product market deregulation will induce these neck-and-neck firms to innovate in
order to escape competition, since the incremental value of getting ahead rises in the degree of
competition. When competition is high to begin with, however, the economy will have a higher
fraction of sectors with one technological leader and many laggards. Further deregulation then
has negative effects on innovation. Since more competition reduces the net rent that can be
captured by laggards who succeed in catching up, the incentives for them to try will get
weaker. This is the Schumpeterian effect of more competition. Although our focus in this
paper is not on product market characteristics, we will control for them in our empirical work.
Moreover, as we have mentioned above, the degree of product market competition may also
be a factor that changes the effect of wage pressure on firms’ investment in R&D.
3 Empirical analysis
Our empirical analysis follows Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and relies on a simple
R&D investment model that considers real per capita business funded and performed R&D
investment (BERDit) to be a function of a mix of policy instruments (POLICYit), discussed
in Section 2, and of real per capita value added generated by the business sector (V Ait). A
set of other possible determinants of business R&D investment are included in (Zit). Finally,
we explicitly investigate the possible impact of wage formation (WAGEit) on BERDit,
BERDit = f(V Ait, POLICYit, Zit,WAGEit), (1)
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where subscripts i and t respectively denote the ith country and tth period. The exact
functional form for equation (1) will depend on the discussion of the properties of the data
in Section 3.1.3.
3.1 A first look at the data
3.1.1 Data and sources
We analyse the determinants of real per capita business R&D for a group of 14 OECD
countries2 using yearly data over the period 1981-2012. An overview of the construction of
all data and their sources can be found in Appendix C.
Figure 1 reported wide variation across the countries in our sample, both in the level and
the evolution of business expenditure on R&D. Policy instruments included in POLICYit
are real per capita government intramural expenditure on R&D (GOV ERDit) and real per
capita expenditure on R&D in the higher education sector (HERDit). As a measure for
direct R&D subsidies (SUBSit) we include real per capita government funded expenditure
on R&D performed in the business sector. A final measure included in POLICYit is the
B-index (BINDEXit), which captures direct R&D tax incentives
3. In our empirical analysis,
V Ait, BERDit and all variables in POLICYit will be expressed in logarithms.
Regarding the variables in Zit, we focus on three possible determinants of business sector
R&D, i.e. the degree of openness of the economy (OPENit), the available stock of high-
skilled human capital (HCAPit) in a country and the degree of product market regulation
(PMRit). The degree of openness is included to account for international trade, which is an
important channel of knowledge and technology transfers across countries raising the return
to domestic business R&D investment (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman, and
Hoffmaister, 2009; Acharya and Keller, 2009). Based on this argument, we expect a positive
effect from a higher degree of openness on BERD. The stock of high-skilled human capital is
considered because of its potential double impact on business R&D investment. First, human
capital is an important determinant of the absorptive capacity of an economy with regards
to international technology and knowledge (see amongst others Nelson, Denison, Sato, and
Phelps, 1966; Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister, 2009). Second, and more directly, the fraction
of highly educated people in the economy is a key determinant of the supply of scientists and
researchers, and therefore a central factor in the R&D production function. As to product
market regulation, it would be our basic position to expect a U-shaped relationship with R&D
investment, in line with the arguments raised by Aghion, Bloom, Griffith, and Howitt (2005)
2These countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. The selection of countries has been driven by data availability.
3See Section 2.1 for more details.
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that we discussed in section 2.2. We measure OPENit as the sum of imports and exports of
goods and services as a percentage of GDP. As a proxy for the stock of human capital, we
use the percentage of the population aged 15 and over that has completed tertiary schooling.
To capture PMRit, the OECD economy-wide product market regulation index is employed.
As a final determinant of business R&D investment, we introduce an indicator for wage
pressure. Its construction is discussed in Section 3.1.2.
3.1.2 An appropriate wage indicator
To assess the impact of wage formation and wage pressure on business R&D investment, we
follow Blanchard (2006) and use insights from growth theory. The approach is to compare
actual (growth of) real wage costs with the so-called ’warranted’ real wage (growth). The
latter is determined by the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress. In growth theory, this
is the rate of real wage growth consistent with stable employment along a balanced growth
path. Blanchard (2006) constructs the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress using the
Solow residual, and dividing it by the labour share. More formally, let Wit represent real
hourly labour cost in country i at time t and let Ait be a measure of labour efficiency driven
by technological progress. The underlying CRS production function is
Yit = K
α
itG
β
it(AitLit)
(1−α−β), (2)
with Yit real output, Kit the stock of real private physical capital, Git the stock of real public
capital, Lit total hours worked, and AitLit effective labour in hours. Labour efficiency can
then be computed as:
lnAit =
1
1− α− β [lnYit − α lnKit − β lnGit − (1− α− β) lnLit] (3)
Following Blanchard’s reasoning, a suitable wage gap or wage pressure indicator will then be
defined as real hourly labour cost per efficiency unit of labour, WitAit . In our empirical analysis,
we will express this indicator in logs, such that we get
lnWAGEit = ln
Wit
Ait
= lnWit − lnAit (4)
As to data, Wit represents real compensation of employees per hour. To compute lnAit,
we estimate the production function in (2) for the same panel of countries that we study in
our empirical analysis of private R&D investment. In line with, amongst others, Costantini
and Destefanis (2009), Eberhardt and Teal (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers
(2015), we account for the presence of unobserved common factors that are potentially non-
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stationary. Estimation of this production function yields a share of private capital in total
income (α) of 0.20, a share of public capital (β) of 0.14, and a labour share (1−α−β) of 0.66.
Our estimate for β is very close to the results reported by Bom and Ligthart (2014). Building
on a meta-regression analysis, they put forward 0.11 as long-run output elasticity of public
capital. Using the Blanchard indicator has the additional advantage that it is not (directly)
affected by endogenous adjustment of labour productivity, as is the case for more traditional
indicators that measure the wage gap by relating real labour cost to labour productivity i.e.
output per hour or per worker. Such indicators will give the wrong sign when firms adjust
capital intensity in response to wage changes. For example, excessive wage increases may
induce firms to substitute capital for labour. The productivity of labour will then rise and
excessive wage pressure may no longer show up in the data, implying measurement error.
Figure 2 shows our indicator for wage pressure (lnWAGEit) in three groups of countries:
six euro area countries, four Nordic countries and four Anglo-Saxon countries. Note that
for each country, we normalized the wage gap to zero in 1974. Although this is obviously
somewhat arbitrary, the idea is that in the early 1970s about all countries were close to full
employment, so that wages must have been more or less at their ’warranted’ level4. All in all,
our indicator is very similar to the real wage gap of Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007), which is
also based on the Blanchard approach.
Wage pressure increased strongly in most countries throughout the second half of the
1970s, with a peak around 1982. From then onwards, the trend in the wage gap was negative
in most countries. Many countries, such as Belgium, Italy and Sweden, institutionalized
mechanisms of wage moderation or wage control to bring (and keep) the evolution of wages
more in line with their warranted level. Other countries, like the UK, decentralized wage
bargaining, and introduced tough legislation to reduce union power. Only in the early 1990s
and in the first years after the recent financial crisis, we observe a temporary resurgence of
wage pressure. The main exceptions to this overall pattern are the US, the Netherlands,
Canada and Spain. The evolution of wages was exceptional in the US in that we see no excess
wage growth in the 1970s. Moreover, since 1980, wage growth in the US has only been slightly
smaller than its warranted level, keeping the wage gap between 0 and -8 % all of the time.
The Netherlands, by contrast, shows a steady decline of wage pressure throughout almost
the entire period under consideration. This confirms the strong focus on wage moderation
as an important policy instrument in this country. Very influential in this respect was the
so-called Wassenaar agreement of 1982, which initiated a series of national social contracts
to restrain wage growth. Unions were convinced of the need to restrain inflationary pressure
4Even if this assumption were wrong for some countries, it will not affect our estimation results in Section
4, since we control for unobserved country fixed effects. What matters is the evolution of lnWAGE over time,
not its initial level.
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Figure 2: Indicator of wage pressure (lnWAGEit) for three groups of countries
(a) Euro area countries (b) Nordic countries
(c) Anglo-Saxon countries
in the labour market and co-ordinated action was introduced to bring this about. Canada
and Spain differ in the sense that we see no wage moderation in these countries during the
last three decades.
In our regressions in Section 4 we will at first introduce lnWAGE as a separate variable.
Building on our discussion in Section 2.2, however, we will soon add interaction terms with
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context variables that may tilt the effect of wage pressure on R&D investment. The degree of
openness (OPEN) and the degree of product market regulation (PMR), already discussed
in Section 3.1.1, affect the strength of the competition that firms experience. The degree
of employment protection legislation (EPL) determines the difficulty that firms may face to
adapt by changing (expensive) labour. All three context variables OPEN , PMR and EPL
affect the impact of wage pressure on the difference between the profits that firms may expect
to earn when they innovate and when they do not innovate.
3.1.3 Properties of the data
As a guide to selecting the most appropriate estimation method in Section 3.3 and to deter-
mine the optimal functional form for equation (1), we first look at two important properties
of the data: the degree of cross-sectional dependence and the order of integration.
Cross-sectional dependence
Recently, the panel data literature has seen an increasing interest in models with unobserved,
time-varying heterogeneity that may stem from omitted (and unobserved) common variables
or global shocks that affect all units, but perhaps to a different degree (see e.g. Coakley,
Fuertes, and Smith, 2002; Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert and Pozzi, 2014). These omit-
ted common variables induce error cross-sectional dependence and may lead to inconsistent
estimates if they are correlated with the explanatory variables and to a spurious regression
problem if they are non-stationary.
At the macroeconomic level, cross-sectional dependencies are rather the rule than the
exception because countries are interconnected through trade, geography, international rela-
tions etc. (Westerlund, 2008). When considering the potential determinants of business R&D
intensity across OECD countries, unobserved common variables are also likely to be present.
A first potential common factor is a global business cycle, which results from the increased
business cycle synchronization across countries. Changes in this global business cycle affect
the financial constraints of both the government and the business sector and will thus have
an impact on business R&D intensity (Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe, 2003). A second, and
probably more important unobserved common factor is the world level of technology and
knowledge. A key characteristic of new technology is that it may spill over to other firms and
countries. Eberhardt, Helmers, and Strauss (2013) have shown that these spillovers affect
firms’ private returns to R&D. Depending on the extent to which firms and countries enjoy
these spillovers, the world level of technology will be an important (but unobserved) factor
driving business R&D expenditures.
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If these unobserved common factors have indeed an impact on business R&D, this should
show up as strong cross-sectional dependence in the data. Table 1 therefore reports the
average pairwise correlation coefficient (ρˆ) and the cross-sectional dependence (CD) test of
Pesaran (2004). As all series are potentially non-stationary, we also report results for the
first-differenced data to avoid spurious nonzero correlation. To assess if common factors are
really influencing business R&D, especially the cross-sectional dependence in lnBERDit is
important. For completeness, we also report the test results for each of the explanatory
variables.
The results in Table 1 show that all variables except one exhibit considerable positive
cross-sectional correlation in levels and in first differences. lnSUBSit is the exception as the
null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence is not rejected for the variable in levels, but is
rejected for the data in first differences. The finding of significant cross-sectional dependence
in lnBERDit implies that we need to take this into account when choosing our econometric
methodology and estimating our empirical model.
Table 1: Cross-sectional dependence in the data
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Levels First-differences Levels First-differences
ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD ρ̂ CD
lnBERDit 0.881 47.55 [0.00] 0.194 10.277 [0.00] lnBINDEXit 0.190 10.255 [0.00] 0.037 1.965 [0.05]
lnV Ait 0.926 49.955 [0.00] 0.575 30.544 [0.00] OPENit 0.701 37.830 [0.00] 0.669 35.507 [0.00]
lnGOV ERDit 0.051 2.745 [0.01] 0.054 2.87 [0.01] HCAPit 0.930 50.185 [0.00] 0.05 2.656 [0.01]
lnHERDit 0.961 51.868 [0.00] 0.089 4.771 [0.00] lnWAGEit 0.415 2.379 [0.00] 0.447 23.745 [0.00]
lnSUBSit 0.027 1.468 [0.14] 0.043 2.262 [0.02] PMRit 0.958 51.738 [0.00] 0.191 10.147 [0.00]
Notes: The average cross-correlation coefficient ρ̂ = (2 /N (N − 1))∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij is the average of the country-by-country
cross-correlation coefficients ρ̂ij (for i 6= j). CD is the Pesaran (2004) test defined as
√
2T /N (N − 1) ∑N−1i=1 ∑Nj=i+1 ρ̂ij ,
which is asymptotically standard normal under the null of cross-sectional independence. p-values are reported in square
brackets.
Time series properties
An analysis of the time series properties of each variable in our empirical model requires a
panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence. Such panel unit root tests have
been proposed by, most notably, Pesaran (2007), Moon and Perron (2004) and Bai and Ng
(2004). These tests are similar in that they all assume an observed variable xit to have the
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following common factor structure
xit = dit + ftpii + ξit, (5)
where ft is an r× 1 vector of r common factors with country-specific factor loadings pii, ξit is
an idiosyncratic error term and dit is a deterministic component which can be (i) zero, dit = 0,
(ii) an idiosyncratic intercept, dit = d0i, or (iii) an idiosyncratic intercept and idiosyncratic
linear trend dit = d0i + d1it. Cross-sectional dependence stems from the component ftpii
which is correlated over countries as it includes the common factors ft. The series xit is non-
stationary if at least one of the common factors in ft is non-stationary, or the idiosyncratic
error ξit is non-stationary, or both. The above mentioned panel unit root tests differ in the
allowed number and order of integration of the unobserved common factors and in the way
these factors are eliminated.
The most general panel unit root test allowing for cross-sectional dependence is the PANIC
unit root test of Bai and Ng (2004) as this is the only one that allows for non-stationarity in
either the common factors, or in the idiosyncratic errors, or in both. Rather than testing the
order of integration using the observed data, xit is first decomposed according to the structure
in equation (5). By applying the method of principal components to the first-differenced data,
the common and idiosyncratic components in first-differences can be estimated consistently,
irrespectively of their orders of integration. Next, these components are accumulated to obtain
the corresponding level estimates f̂pct and ξ̂
pc
it . These components can then be tested separately
for unit roots. When there is only one factor, testing for a unit root in f̂pct can be done using
a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)-type test (with deterministic terms according to
the specification of dit). For multiple common factors, the MQ
c,τ
c and MQ
c,τ
f statistics (see
Bai and Ng, 2004, for details) are designed to determine the number of independent stochastic
trends r1 ≤ r in f̂pct . As under the appropriate choice for the number of common factors,
ξ̂pcit by design satisfies the cross-sectional independence assumption required for pooling, the
Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) panel unit root test can be used on ξ̂pcit . This test consists
of combining p-values for the ADF tests (with no deterministic terms) on the idiosyncratic
error ξ̂pcit . The relevant distributions for the ADF tests on f̂
pc
t and ξ̂
pc
it , for the intercept only
and the linear trend model, can be found in Bai and Ng (2004).
Monte Carlo simulation results in Bai and Ng (2004), for samples as small as (T=100,
N=40), and in Gutierrez (2006), for samples as small as (T=50, N=20), show that the
PANIC approach performs well in small samples. The ADF test on the common factor and
the MW test on the idiosyncratic error terms both have an actual size close to the 5% nominal
level and adequate power. Applications of the PANIC approach to unit root testing using a
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similar data span as ours (T=32, N=14) can be found in, among others, Byrne, Fiess, and
Ronald (2011), Costantini, Demetriades, James, and Lee (2013) and Everaert, Heylen, and
Schoonackers (2015).
Table 2: PANIC unit root tests
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
f̂pct ξ̂
pc
it f̂
pc
t ξ̂
pc
it
Det r r1 MW-test Det r r1 MW-test
lnBERDit dit 1 1 37.907 [0.10] lnBINDEX0i dit 0 0 17.45 [0.93]
lnV Ait dit 3 3 24.854 [0.64] OPENit dit 2 2 12.364 [1.00]
lnGOV ERDit d0i 1 1 12.056 [1.00] HCAPit dit 5 5 42.238 [0.04]
lnHERDit dit 0 0 27.91 [0.47] lnWAGEit d0i 3 3 21.597 [0.80]
lnSUBSit dit 1 1 27.868 [0.47] PMRit dit 3 3 24.572 [0.65]
Notes: ‘Det’ indicates the deterministic component of the model, i.e. d0i for the intercept only model and dit = d0i+d1it
for the linear trend model. The number of common factors is estimated using the BIC3 of Bai and Ng (2002) with a
maximum of 5 factors. When r = 1, the number of non-stationary factors r1 is determined using the ADF-GLS test of
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) with deterministic terms according to the specification of dit. When r > 1, r1 is
determined using the MQcc (intercept only model) or MQ
τ
c (linear trend model) statistic of Bai and Ng (2004). The panel
unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors is the Maddala and Wu (1999) (MW) test (with no deterministic
terms). The null hypothesis for each of these tests is that the series has a unit root. p-values are reported in square
brackets.
In Table 2 we report the results of the PANIC unit root tests. For each of the variables
the number of common factors r is estimated using the BIC3 information criterion suggested
by Bai and Ng (2002). Their simulation results, as well as those of Moon and Perron (2007),
show that the BIC3 outperforms other information criteria in small samples like ours. The
specification of the deterministic component dit is chosen from the observed trending be-
haviour of the variables. Results show that all variables are found to be non-stationary at the
5 % level of significance. For all but two variables, the non-stationarity is induced by both
the common component and idisoyncratic errors. For the variable HCAPit non-stationarity
only stems from the presence of a set of unobserved common factors while for lnHERDit
non-stationarity comes from the idiosyncratic component as this variable is found to have no
common factor according to the BIC3 information criterion. When focusing on the main vari-
able of interest, lnBERDit, the Bai and Ng (2002) test to determine the number of common
factors shows the presence of 1 non-stationary common factor.
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3.2 Empirical model
Our empirical analysis shares the macro focus of existing research by Guellec and Van Pottels-
berghe (2003), Falk (2006) and Westmore (2014). While these authors study both the long-run
and the short-run relationship between privately-funded business R&D and its drivers, our
focus is on the long-run cointegrating relationship only. An important contribution of this
paper, however, is that we fully take into account (and deal with) the two key properties of
the data that we described in the previous section, i.e. the significant degree of cross-sectional
dependence due to the presence of unobserved common factors and the non-stationarity of the
variables considered. We consider as our basic specification the following long-run relationship
for lnBERDit,
lnBERDit = γi +Xitβ + µit. (6)
where Xit = (lnV Ait, lnPOLICYit, Zit, lnWAGEit) and β
′ = (β1, β2, β3, β4). In this
equation, the individual effect γi captures unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity.
To deal with cross-sectionally correlated errors (see Section 3.1.3) we adopt a multi-factor
error structure, where cross-sectional dependence is modelled to arise from unobserved com-
mon factors (see e.g. Eberhardt and Teal, 2011; Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers, 2015):
µit = λ
′
ift + it, (7)
where ft is an rx1 vector of unobserved common factors and λi an rx1 country-specific vector
of factor loadings. The generality of the error structure in (7) is an advantage as it allows
for an unknown (but fixed) number of unobserved common components with heterogeneous
factor loadings (heterogeneous cross-sectional dependence). It thus also nests common time
effects (homogeneous cross-sectional dependence) as a special case and controls for possible
spatial spillovers (Pesaran and Tosetti, 2011). This last element could be important as in a
recent paper Montmartin and Herrera (2015) point to the importance of spatial dependence
between private R&D activities in OECD countries.
In the empirical analysis we will focus on determining the long-run drivers of business
sector R&D by estimating equation (6). Note that when estimating this equation it is impor-
tant to deal appropriately with the multi-factor error structure in (7) as ignoring the presence
of unobserved common factors leads to inconsistent estimates if the unobserved factors are
correlated with the explanatory variables and to a spurious regression problem if they are non-
stationary. Finally, as all variables have a unit root we test for the existence of a cointegration
relationship between the variables in (6).
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3.3 Econometric methodology
In line with Pesaran (2006) and Kapetanios, Pesaran, and Yamagata (2011), the set of unob-
served common factors ft is identified from the cross-sectional dimension of the data. Taking
cross-sectional averages of the model represented by equations (6)-(7) yields
yt = γ + λft +Xtβ + t, (8)
where yit = lnBERDit and where yt =
1
N
∑N
i=1 yit and similarly for γ, λ, Xt and t. For
notational convenience we assume a single common factor (r = 1) but the results straightfor-
wardly generalize to multiple factors (see Pesaran, 2006). Equation (8) can then be solved
for ft as
ft =
1
λ
(
yt − γ −Xtβ − t
)
, (9)
which yields f̂ cat
f̂ cat =
1
λ
(
yt − γ −Xtβ
)
, (10)
as a proxy for ft. Under the assumption that it is a zero mean stationary error term which is
uncorrelated over cross-section units, implying that plim
N→∞
t = 0 for each t, we have that f̂
ca
t
p−→
ft for N →∞. This is the main result in Pesaran (2006) that the cross-sectional averages of
the observed data can be used as observable proxies for ft. Although the construction of f̂
ca
t
as a consistent estimator for ft in equation (10) requires knowledge of the unknown underlying
parameters, Pesaran (2006) shows that these parameters can be estimated from an augmented
model obtained by replacing the unobserved ft in equation (7) by the cross-sectional averages
of the observed data using equation (9)
yit = γi +
(
yt − γ −Xtβ − t
) λi
λ
+Xitβ + εit, (11)
= γ+i + ytλi1 +Xtλi2 +Xitβ + 
+
it , (12)
where γ+i = γi − γλi
/
λ , λi1 = λi
/
λ , λi2 = −λi
/
λ β and +it = it − λi
/
λ t. Since 
+
it
p−→ it
for N → ∞, the augmented model in equation (12) - ignoring any parameter restrictions -
can be estimated with least squares (LS), an approach referred to as the CCEP estimator.5
Pesaran (2006) shows that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the CCEP estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal in stationary panel regressions. Kapetanios, Pesaran,
5Although equation (12) is derived, for notational convenience, under the assumption of a single factor,
exactly the same augmented form is obtained for multiple common factors (see Pesaran, 2006).
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and Yamagata (2011) show that these asymptotic results continu to hold in non-stationary
panels provided that the idiosyncratic error term it is stationary. This requires that there is
cointegration (i) between (yit, Xit) if ft ∼ I(0) or (ii) between (yit, Xit, ft) if ft ∼ I(1).
As our empirical analysis involves testing for cointegration, we need an appropriate panel
cointegration test based on the CCEP estimator. These kind of tests have been suggested
by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) and Everaert (2014). Banerjee and Carrion-i-
Silvestre (2011) show that under the null of no cointegration, the linear CCEP estimator allows
for consistent estimation of the homogeneous coefficients β but not for the heterogeneous
coefficients (γi, λi). Given this result, they suggest to obtain a consistent estimate for the
composite error term eit = γi + λift + it as
êit = yit −Xitβ̂ = ̂(γi + λift + it), (13)
and test for cointegration using a panel unit root test on êit that takes into account the
cross-sectional dependence induced by the set of unobserved common factors ft. To this
end, they suggest to use the cross-section augmented ADF (CADF) panel unit root test of
Pesaran (2007). Although this approach can effectively sweep out a single common factor, ft
is restricted to have the same order of integration as the idiosyncratic error term it. This rules
out that ft ∼ I(1) and it ∼ I(0), i.e. cointegration between (yit, xit, ft). Since the structure
of the composite error term eit = γi + λift + it aligns with the general factor structure of
equation (5), an obvious alternative to the CADF test is to apply the PANIC approach of Bai
and Ng (2004).6 This allows to consistently decompose êit in a set of common factors, denoted
f̂pct , and an idiosyncratic error term, labeled ̂
pc
it , which can then be separately tested for unit
roots (see PANIC approach outlined in Section 3.1.3). The main advantage of this approach
is that the test whether the idiosyncratic errors it are stationary or not does not depend on
the order of integration of ft. As such, testing for cointegration from the CCEP estimation
results boils down to testing whether there is a unit root in ̂pcit , for which the MW panel unit
root test can be used. Note that although cointegration only requires the idiosyncratic errors
to be I(0), the integration properties of the common factors provide additional interesting
information, i.e. when ft ∼ I(0) there is cointegration between (yit, Xit) while for ft ∼ I(1)
there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). In a simulation exercise both Everaert (2014) and
Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015) show that a PANIC on the composite error term
6Using the PANIC approach to testing for panel cointegration in the presence of common factors has also
been suggested by Gengenbach, Palm, and Urbain (2006), Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2006) and Bai and
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2013). The main difference between these approaches and ours lies in the estimation of
the unknown coefficients in the cointegrating relation, for which we use the CCEP estimator while the above
references estimate a model in first-differences with the common factors and factor loadings estimated using
principal components.
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êit is an appropriate approach to test for common-factor augmented panel cointegration, even
in small samples as ours.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Main results
The main estimation results are reported in Table 4. As mentioned before, our dependent
variable is the log of real per capita R&D investment financed and performed by the busi-
ness sector (lnBERDit). We estimate 10 different specifications. We start in column (1)
by considering the standard set of variables that Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) in-
troduce in their regressions. Next to value added in the business sector (lnV Ait), there are
four policy variables: public funding of R&D projects in the business sector (lnSUBSit),
the B-index reflecting a country’s tax treatment of R&D investment (lnBINDEXit), direct
’intramural’ government expenditures on R&D (lnGOV ERDit) and expenditures on R&D
by higher education institutions (lnHERDit). In columns (2)-(4) we respectively extend the
set of explanatory variables by the degree of openness (OPENit), the stock of high-skilled
human capital (HCAPit) and our wage pressure indicator (lnWAGEit). Column (5) further
controls for a non-linear impact of the amount of public subsidies whereas columns (6)-(10)
test for non-linear and/or heterogeneous effects of wage pressure.
In a first step each specification is tested for the existence of a cointegration relationship
using the PANIC approach of Bai and Ng (2004), which requires determining the number of
unobserved common factors in lnBERDit. The analysis in Table 2 points to the existence of
1 common factor in lnBERDit. As an additional check, Table 3 reports the cross-sectional
correlation in lnBERDit and in the CCEP composite error term êit after taking out the con-
tribution of r = (0, 1, 2, 3) common factors. For r = 0, this is the cross-sectional correlation
in the original series, while for r > 0 this is the cross-sectional correlation in the idiosyncratic
part calculated using PANIC with r = (1, 2, 3). The results confirm the presence of one com-
mon factor as this seems sufficient to remove the cross-sectional dependence from lnBERDit
and the CCEP composite error term.
FE results
To highlight the importance of dealing with cross-sectional dependence for the estimation
results, we first ignore any unobserved common factors and estimate the empirical model using
a standard FE estimator. The results can be found in Appendix A. Using the FE estimator,
we cannot reject the null of no cointegration in any specification. The PANIC cointegration
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Table 3: Determining the number of relevant common factors
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
Cross-sectional correlation left after taking out r factors
r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3 r = 0 r = 1 r = 2 r = 3
lnBERDit 0.881 -0.053 -0.063 -0.055 ∆ lnBERDit 0.1935 -0.048 -0.06 -0.059
êSit1 0.549 -0.015 -0.017 -0.0384 ∆ê
S
it1 0.086 -0.02 -0.013 -0.041
êSit2 0.487 -0.028 -0.041 -0.024 ∆ê
S
it2 0.096 -0.032 -0.034 -0.039
êSit3 0.194 -0.044 -0.044 -0.063 ∆ê
S
it3 0.112 -0.038 -0.032 -0.056
êSit4 0.574 -0.026 -0.040 -0.043 ∆ê
S
it4 0.092 -0.025 -0.028 -0.039
êSit5 0.131 -0.058 -0.062 -0.066 ∆ê
S
it5 0.147 -0.045 -0.048 -0.058
êSit6 0.086 -0.047 -0.039 -0.056 ∆ê
S
it6 0.128 -0.047 -0.038 -0.049
êSit7 0.089 -0.042 -0.044 -0.052 ∆ê
S
it7 0.116 -0.039 -0.04 -0.054
êSit8 0.127 -0.052 -0.063 -0.053 ∆ê
S
it8 0.154 -0.047 -0.055 -0.06
êSit9 0.817 -0.047 -0.047 -0.052 ∆ê
S
it9 0.117 -0.040 -0.036 -0.054
êSit10 0.315 -0.051 -0.043 -0.054 ∆ê
S
it10 0.103 -0.038 -0.027 -0.049
Note: êSit1, ê
S
it2,..., ê
S
it8 are the CCEP composite error terms, defined in equation (13) taken from specification
(1),(2),...,(10) respectively. We report the average cross-correlation ρ̂ (see Table 1 for the definition) after taking out r
common factors using PANIC.
test at the bottom of Table 7 shows that both the common factor and the idiosyncratic error
term are non-stationary at the 5% level of significance. This is problematic as Urbain and
Westerlund (2011) show that the standard result in Phillips and Moon (1999) that panel
regressions yield consistent results even if there is no cointegration, does no longer hold when
the non-stationarity in the error term is induced by a common factor. This implies that the
results from the FE estimator, which ignores the presence of non-stationary common factors,
are spurious. As such we do not interpret these results.
CCEP results
When we use the CCEP estimator and so control for unobserved common factors, we can
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 10% level or better for all specifications
containing our wage indicator. Table 4 reports the results. We obtain the best test results,
i.e. rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 1% level, in specifications (6) and (7).
These specifications do not only include the wage gap, but also allow its effect on business
R&D investment to depend on the institutional context as reflected by OPENit or EPLit.
In this sense, our results are supportive to the overall hypothesis on non-uniform wage effects
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that we formulated in Section 3. Looking in detail at the PANIC cointegration test results,
the time series properties of the unobserved common factor ft reveal that this variable is part
of the cointegration relationship. So there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft).
Regarding the estimated coefficients, the effect of total value added on R&D investment
in the business sector is robustly positive and statistically significant in all our regressions.
The estimated (partial) long-run elasticity varies between 0.43 and 0.75, the median being
0.65. As to public policies, our estimation results reveal various ways in which governments
can effectively promote R&D investment in a country. One approach is to give tax incentives
or subsidies and grants to private investors. Another is to spend more on R&D within the
public sector itself if this does not crowd out private spending. Our evidence suggests that
both options can work, if chosen appropriately.
Let us start with the former. In a majority of our regressions, we observe a negative
and statistically significant effect on the B-index of about -0.18, supporting the hypothesis
that tax incentives encourage business R&D investment. This result is clearly in line with
most of the literature that we summarized in Section 2.1. In some of our regressions, though,
the observed negative effect is not statistically significant. For public funding of investment
in the business sector (lnSUBSit) we always obtain positive but mostly highly insignificant
elasticities. Only in specifications (9) and (10) the long-run elasticity varies around 0.045
and is significant at the 5% level. At first sight, our results therefore seems to indicate
that private firms are not encouraged to raise their own R&D expenditures and undertake
additional investments when some of their projects are publicly funded. Neither, however, do
they cut back on their own spending. The observed positive coefficient on lnSUBSit clearly
challenges the hypothesis that subsidized private firms would just substitute public money
for their own. Additional analysis, however, as in specification (5), reveals a much richer
reality behind this general result. When we follow Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and
allow for different effects from public funding on business R&D expenditures depending on
the level of the subsidization percentage, we find both at low subsidization rates (i.e. below
4%) and at high subsidization rates (above 11%) a negative elasticity of public funding7.
At intermediate subsidization rates, however, we find this elasticity to be positive (0.076)
and statistically significant. We conclude that direct government funding can be effective in
promoting business R&D investment, but this funding should not be too low, neither too
high. In the former case support may be too weak to help firms overcome the risks and
uncertainties involved in innovation projects. In the latter case, support may be larger than
7We follow Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) and use the share of government funded R&D in total
business performed R&D as a proxy for the subsidization rate. We find this rate to be low (< 4 % on average
over the sample period) in Australia and Finland, and high (> 11%) in France, Italy, Norway, Spain, UK and
US. The other countries take intermediate positions.
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the number of (new) projects that firms can develop, so that in the end they simply use public
resources to finance projects that would have been done anyway. In this sense we confirm
earlier evidence by Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003)8.
Results on the effects of R&D spending within the government sector (lnGOV ERDit) and
within institutions of higher education (lnHERDit) all go in the same direction. The effect
is positive in almost all cases but small and mostly insignificant. Although this may sound
poor from a statistical perspective, it is not unimportant economically. It means that each
euro that the government spends on ’intramural’ R&D or on R&D within universities adds
one euro to aggregate spending on R&D. Our findings therefore go against the hypothesis
of (weak) crowding out, for which Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2003) found evidence,
as well as against the hypothesis of complementarity between public and private spending,
as suggested by Falk (2006). Only for lnGOV ERDit in columns (6) and (7) we may find
some weak indications in favour of complementarity. The regressions in these columns yield
a long-run positive elasticity of about 0.19.
Important is also that governments can stimulate private R&D investment by encouraging
high-skilled human capital formation. This is confirmed by our empirical results which yield
very robust and significant positive estimates on the stock of high-skilled human capital
(HCAPit). Considering the lack of consistent findings in the existing literature (see for
example Falk, 2006), this is an interesting result. We also find a positive effect from the degree
of openness of the economy on business R&D spending. In column (2) this positive effect
is not statistically significant. In specification (6) it is. This may point to the importance
of international transfer of technology and knowledge for business R&D. However, in line
with results that we discuss below for the wage gap, a complementary interpretation could
be that a more open economy raises the degree of competition that firms face. Facing more
competitors then seems to encourage firms to innovate.
An important potential determinant of business R&D investment is wage pressure. The-
ory being inconclusive, what do we learn from our results on its impact on innovation? When
analyzing the basic effect in specifications (4) and (5) we do not find any significant effect
from wage formation on business R&D investment. In column (4) the effect is insignificantly
negative whereas in column (5) it is insignificantly positive. However, a much more detailed
8Obviously, considering our use of macro data, the non-linear relationship that we find is also a macro
feature. Low or high macro rates of subsidies may hide large firm-level heterogeneity in the subsidies.
9The observed elasticities allow us to compute the marginal effect on business financed R&D and on
aggregate R&D spending (business + public) induced by one euro spent by the government. Considering that
BERDit relates to GOV ERDit as 5 to 1 and to SUBSit as 13 to 1 on average over all countries considered
in our analysis, elasticities of 0.126 for GOV ERDit and 0.076 for SUBSit (the highest we observe in our
results) would imply that ∆BERDit
∆GOVERDit
= 0.63 and ∆BERDit
∆SUBSit
=0.99. In the case of GOV ERDit, aggregate
R&D spending would thus rise by 1.63 euro (1 euro public + 0.63 euro private), in the case of SUBSit by 1.99
euro (1 euro public + 0.99 euro private).
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analysis, based on the theoretical arguments in Section 2.2, gives a clearer view. As wage pres-
sure has possibly positive effects in a very competitive environment, we allow in specification
(6) for interaction between lnWAGEit and OPENit. The basic impact of lnWAGEit is now
negative and highly significant, with an estimated long-run coefficient equal to -1.1. If wage
pressure increases with 1 %point, this implies that, on average, business R&D investment
drops with 1.11 %. Higher wage pressure thus seems to undermine business R&D expendi-
tures. An obvious explanation, and in line with Ulph and Ulph (1994), would be that higher
wages reduce the profit differential between innovating and not innovating. However, the basic
hypothesis only seems to survive in economies where firms face relatively little (foreign) com-
petition. In a competitive environment the wage effect may be tilted. From the interaction
term in specification (6) we learn that in countries with a degree of openness higher than 80
% the global impact of wage pressure becomes positive, meaning that higher wages encourage
private R&D investment. Specification (7) differentiates the effect of lnWAGEit according
to the level of employment protection legislation (EPLit)
10. In countries with low average
EPL a significant negative effect of wage pressure emerges, again indicating that higher wages
reduces the incentive to innovate. In (very) regulated labour markets the negative impact
disappears as for the other two groups of countries we observe (insignificant) positive effects
of wage pressure on business R&D investment. As an additional check, the possible impact of
openness and labour market characteristics are integrated in specification (8). We distinguish
three groups of countries. The first group of Anglo-Saxon countries is characterized by a
relatively low degree of openness and low employment protection legislation. The estimated
effect from lnWAGEit is clearly negative in this group (although significant only at 20%).
The second group of euro area countries is characterized by rather the opposite of a high
degree of openness and rigid labour markets. Here we observe a significant positive coefficient
on lnWAGEit. The arguments raised by Kleinknecht (1998) and co-authors that an excessive
focus on wage moderation could be harmful to innovation, would thus seem to find support
for this group. The third group of Nordic countries takes an intermediate position.
10As time variation in EPLit is too limited, we cannot interact lnWAGEit with EPLit. As a solution, we
differentiate the impact of lnWAGEit amongst three groups of countries with different average EPLit
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Table 4: CCEP regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.644
∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.659∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.428∗ 0.512∗∗
(0.18) (0.194) (0.187) (0.242) (0.227) (0.257) (0.249) (0.222) (0.230) (0.240)
lnBINDEXit −0.186∗∗ -0.114 −0.187∗∗ −0.182∗∗ −0.170∗∗ -0.103 -0.10 −0.189∗∗ −0.229∗∗∗ −0.142∗
(0.087) (0.10) (0.089) (0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.080) (0.086) (0.082)
lnSUBSit 0.004 0.01 0.017 0.000 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.046
∗∗ 0.044∗∗
(0.002) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.055 0.053 0.055 0.064 0.059 0.087
∗ 0.126∗∗ 0.021 0.023 0.020
(0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.05) (0.042) (0.053) (0.049)
lnHERDit 0.071 0.063 -0.017 0.096 -0.057 0.042 0.032 0.074 -0.018 0.022
(0.069) (0.072) (0.071) (0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067)
HCAPit 0.051
∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.068∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.002 0.014
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.005)
lnWAGEit -0.205 0.127 −1.108∗∗ -0.085 0.383
(0.211) (0.197) (0.463) (0.202) (0.445)
PMRit 0.419
∗∗ -0.112
(0.196) (0.154)
PMR2it -0.046
(0.036)
lnSUBSit ∗ low -0.053
(0.075)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.076∗∗
(0.034)
lnSUBSit ∗ high −0.087∗∗
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.014∗∗
(0.006)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.295∗
(0.172)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −1.205∗∗∗
(0.447)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.134
(0.474)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh 0.092
(0.257)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo -0.639
(0.464)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 1.331∗∗∗
(0.338)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic 0.27
(0.305)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -0.699 -1.392 -0.931 -0.797 -1.455 -2.105 -1.55 -2.168 -0.073 -0.344
[0.97] [0.84] [0.94] [0.96] [0.82] [0.52] [0.79] [0.49] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on ̂pcit 1.23 1.37
∗ 1.086 1.603∗∗ 1.295∗ 2.446∗∗∗ 2.918∗∗∗ 1.661∗∗ 11.460∗ 2.085∗∗
[0.11] [0.09] [0.14] [0.05] [0.10] [0.01] [0.00] [0.05] [0.07] [0.02]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test
results, the unit root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in
square brackets. The unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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Finally, in specifications (9) and (10) we analyse the direct impact of product market
(de)regulation, PMRit, and its possible effect on the relation between wage pressure and
innovation. Following Aghion, Bloom, Griffith, and Howitt (2005), a U-shaped relationship
should be expected between PMRit and lnBERDit. In specification (9) we do not find ev-
idence for this U-shaped effect. On the contrary, results show that more regulated product
markets increase firms’ incentive to invest in R&D. In this view, higher product market reg-
ulation, and thus lower competition, increases firms’ rents when investing in R&D. When we
also take into account the possible impact of PMRit on the effect of wage pressure on business
R&D in specification (10), the direct impact of PMRit is somewhat different. Now, higher
product market regulation has a negative but insignificant impact on the amount of busi-
ness R&D expenditures. More interesting is the interaction between PMRit and lnWAGEit.
This interaction effect confirms our earlier finding. In a less competitive environment (high
PMRit), higher wage pressure reduces the incentives of firms to invest in R&D. When product
markets become more deregulated, the basic negative effect disappears and in these circum-
stances wage pressure can even stimulate private R&D investment.
4.2 The importance of economic and policy related variables in explaining
private investment in R&D
Our empirical results in Table 4 help us to understand and explain important differences in
the level and evolution of real business R&D in the OECD during the last decades. In what
follows, we discuss the explanatory power of our estimated empirical model and conduct a
counterfactual analysis. The latter allows us to assess the contribution of changes since 1981
in public policy, wage pressure and human capital to the evolution of business R&D. What
fraction of the total change in BERD between 1981 and 2012 can these explanatory variables
explain? Which was more important, which was less important? Are the results the same for
all countries/country groups?
Explanatory power
Figure 3 demonstrates the capacity of our empirical model to explain the variation in business
R&D investment across countries and over time. We use the regression result in specification
(6). The upper panel in Figure 3 (panel a) relates our model’s prediction (economic explana-
tion) for the level of business R&D expenditures in 2006-2007 to the true observation11. Both
prediction and true observation are represented as log deviations from their overall country
11We choose these years as they are the last before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Severe shocks
to firms’ investment decisions during this crisis imply that the data are much less likely to match the long-run
equilibrium relationship that our model captures.
29
averages. The lower panel (panel b) relates predicted and observed changes in business R&D
between 1981 and 2007. We emphasize that our predictions in both panels have been obtained
solely from using the ’economic’ and ’policy related’ parts of the estimated equation. They do
not include the country-specific fixed effects nor the approximations for the country-specific
factor loadings and unobserved common factors.
Correlation in panel (a) is 0.50. Our model correctly predicts far above average business
R&D investment in 2006-2007 in the US and (far) below average R&D investment in Italy
and France. The model’s prediction of close to average performance in Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Denmark and Norway is also quite well in line with the facts. On the other hand,
using only the economic and policy related explanatory variables in the model, it is harder to
match the high level of business R&D investment in 2006-2007 in Finland and Sweden. So it is
to match relatively low investment in Spain. It is clear that for these countries the unobserved
common factor was more important than for other countries. In this respect, our results are
in line with those of Everaert, Heylen, and Schoonackers (2015). Studying the drivers of
TFP, they find for Finland and Sweden a relatively strong and rising absorptive capacity to
the (unobserved and common) world level of technology. Stronger international technology
spillovers, and their effects on the private return to R&D, may explain an important part of
the above average business investment in innovation in these countries. The opposite may
explain weaker investment in Spain. Clearly, the observation that the common factor plays
an important role, at least for some countries, is fully in line with our earlier finding that this
factor belongs to the cointegration relationship. It supports (again) our choice for the CCEP
estimator.
Correlation in panel (b) is 0.34. The model again seems to have the main drivers of
business R&D investment right for the US, France and Italy. It also explains quite well the
change in business R&D investment over time in countries like Austria and Norway. Finland
is again by far the largest outlier. On the basis of (changes in) economic and policy related
variables it is impossible to explain the strong actual rise in BERD since 1981 in this country.
Dropping Finland, correlation in panel (b) rises to 0.50.
Counterfactual analysis
Figure 4 reveals the estimated size of the estimated effects on business R&D expenditures of
changes in public innovation policy, wage pressure, human capital and real value added in the
business sector since 1981 in the US, an average of five EU countries and the Nordic countries
in our sample. Each graph compares the model’s fitted value for these countries with (i) the
simulated value if all policy variables (spending, taxes) had remained at their 1981 level, (ii)
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Figure 3: Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure (Table 4, specification 6)
(a) Actual and predicted business R&D expenditure levels, 2006-2007
(b) Actual and predicted change in business R&D expenditure, 2007 versus 1981
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the simulated value if all policy variables and wage pressure had remained at their 1981 level,
(iii) the simulated value if all policy variables, wage pressure and human capital had remained
at their 1981 level, and (iv) the simulated value if all policy variables, wage pressure, human
capital and real value added had remained at their 1981 level. Individual country graphs are
available upon request.
All three graphs underscore the importance of public policy, wage pressure, human capital
and real value added. As indicated by the lower lines in Figure 4a-c, business R&D investment
in the US and the core EU5 would have remained fairly flat between 1981 and 2012 if these
variables had remained unchanged. The Nordic countries would then have seen an increase
in BERD of about 75%. In this sense, Figure 4 is fully consistent with our earlier findings
in Figure 3. The observed policy and other variables were very important for the evolution
of business R&D investment in most countries. It seems again, though, that in comparative
perspective the Nordic countries also benefited strongly from the evolution of the unobserved
common factor. In the US and the core EU its impact was minimal.
As to the relative contribution of the set of policy variables, the wage gap, value added
and high-skilled human capital for the evolution of BERD, Figure 4 leaves no doubt that
the latter was the most important. In the US the increase of human capital contributed to
more than 75% of the total increase in BERD. In the core EU that was almost 70%, in the
Nordic countries about 40%. Value added comes second in line as a driver of business R&D
investment in each of the three country groups. Public innovation policies come third. In
the core EU changes in policy accounted for a little less than 20% of the observed increase
in BERD since 1981. In the Nordic countries the contribution of policy changes was about
13%, in the US about 9%. Finally, changes in the wage gap may have contributed the least to
change in business R&D investment. This conclusion holds in particular for the US and the
Nordic countries where fairly limited changes in wage pressure, on average, had rather neutral
effects. Changes in the wage gap did matter, however, in the core EU5. The focus on wage
moderation in countries like the Netherlands, Austria and Italy in particular had an important
negative impact on BERD over time. Figure 4 shows that, for the evolution of BERD, the
stimulating effect of public policy in the core EU5 countries was entirely neutralized by the
negative effects of wage moderation.
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Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: fitted and simulated model (Table 4, specification 6)
(a) United States
(b) Core-EU5 (Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Netherlands)
(c) Nordic-4
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4.3 Robustness test: alternative specification of the wage indicator
To construct our wage indicator, lnWAGE, in Section 3.1.2, we used data on the share of
private capital (α), public capital (β) and labour (1−α−β) in total income. Estimation of a
basic production function for the set of countries in our empirical analysis gave us the required
information. However, to show that our results are not sensitive to the exact choice of the
income shares, we also constructed an alternative wage indicator based on different (but evenly
realistic) output elasticities. More specifically, we set α and β equal to respectively 0.30 and
0.10, which is in line with the results reported by Bom and Ligthart (2014), and the resulting
labour share to 0.6. Using these elasticities, we recalculated lnWAGE and re-estimated all
related specifications with the CCEP estimator. Results can be found in Appendix B. For all
specifications, results are similar to the ones in Table 4 and the same conclusions apply. As
an additional robustness check we took into account the empirical observation that bargained
wages tend to be lower the higher the unemployment rate (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald,
1994; Nickell and Quintini, 2003). This may somewhat bias our wage gap indicator. As a
second robustness test, we controlled for this by following Arpaia and Pichelmann (2007) and
added the unemployment rate to our wage indicator. Again, results are very similar to the
ones reported in Table 412.
4.4 Direction of causation
The empirical results in Table 4 give proof of a long-run relationship between lnBERDit
and its determinants. To provide evidence that the long-run coefficients in Table 4 can be
interpreted as empirical causal effects, we apply a test for the direction of caution based on
the approach of Eberhardt and Teal (2013) which builds on the discussion in Canning and
Pedroni (2008). From the Granger Representation Theorem (Engle and Granger, 1987) we
know that if there exists a cointegration relationship between the variables in the model, these
series can be represented in the form of a dynamic error correction model.
Equations (14)-(15) formalize this relationship for our empirical model. For notational
convenience, this is done under the assumption of 1 (r = 1) common factor, ft, and of 1
variable included in Xit.
12Results using this alternative wage indicator are not reported here, but are available upon request.
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∆ lnBERDit = κ1i + α1ε̂i,t−1 + ρ1i∆ft +
J∑
j=1
φ11j∆ lnBERDi,t−j +
J∑
j=1
φ12j∆Xi,t−j + ν1it,
(14)
∆Xit = κ2i + α2ε̂i,t−1 + ρ2i∆ft +
J∑
j=1
φ21j∆ lnBERDi,t−j +
J∑
j=1
φ22j∆Xi,t−j + ν2it.
(15)
where ε̂i,t−1 represents the ’disequilibrium term’. The cointegration test results from Table 4
show that there is cointegration between (yit, Xit, ft). This implies that the ’disequilibrium
term’ is constructed as ε̂it = lnBERDit−γi−Xitβ−λift and that ft is included in equations
(14)-(15). As a proxy for ft and for ε̂it, we use the results of the PANIC cointegration testing
procedure which provides us respectively with f̂pct and ̂
pc
it . Equations (14)-(15) further include
lagged differences of the observable variables in the cointegrating relationship.
For a long-run relationship to exist between lnBERDit, Xit and ft, α1 or α2 must be
nonzero . If α1 6= 0 then Xit has a causal impact on lnBERDit; if α2 6= 0 then lnBERDit has
a causal impact on Xit. If both α1 and α2 are non-zero, Xit and lnBERDit determine each
other jointly. In the above example there are only two equations, as we have two variables in
the cointegration relationship. In our empirical analysis we will have k + 1 equations, with k
being the number of variables in Xit. Empirical estimates for α1, α2,...,αk+1 are investigated
using standard t-ratios, given that all variables in the ECM regression are stationary13.
Results are presented in Table 5 for two lags (J = 2), but the same conclusions can be
drawns for one lag (J = 1). Due to the limited time series dimension of our data, we do not
consider extra lags. In Table 5, the first row of each specification refers to the estimation of α̂1,
while for all other rows, α̂2 is estimated with the dependent variable the variable mentioned in
the column ’Variable’. Table 5 shows that for each specification that we have estimated, Xit
has an impact on lnBERDit. This can be seen from the estimation of equation (14) in row 1
for each specification in Table 5. To be sure that the estimated impact is causal, equation (15)
is estimated for each element in Xit as a dependent variable. If the error correction term of
these equations is zero, then the corresponding x-variable has a causal impact on lnBERDit.
The results in Table 5 show that all results can be interpreted as empirical causal effects as
13The disequilibrium term ε̂it constructed from specifications (1), (2), (3) and (5) is not stationary at the
5% significance level but still stationary at the 10% level for specifications (2) and (5). This implies that for
the ’direction of causation’ test based on specification (1) and (3) we should employ simulated critical values.
However, in our analysis we still use standard t-ratios with the reason being that the p-values of stationarity
of the disequilibrium term are very close to 10 % and that we are mainly interested in the specifications that
include our wage measure.
35
no error correction term is significant when estimating equation (15).
As an additional check we allow the short term coefficients (φ11j , φ12j , φ21j and φ22j) and
the error correction terms (α1 and α2) in equations (14) and (15) to vary across countries.
Results for the ’direction of causation’ test when allowing for this heterogeneity can be found
in Table 6, where the mean group results are reported. When allowing for short-term het-
erogeneity across countries, conclusions on the direction of causation are somewhat different.
First, there is clear evidence that lnHERDit and lnBERDit determine each other jointly.
This implies that the coefficient on lnHERDit in our specifications should be interpreted
as a correlation and not as a causal effect. Evidence of reverse causality is also present for
lnV Ait as is shown by the test results of specification (3), (5),(7) and (8). For PMRit, the
test results of specification (10) indicate a possible problem of reverse causality, although only
at the 10 % significance level. Finally, it is also important to note that only in specification
(7) there is some indication that the coefficients on lnWAGEit could not be interpreted as
causal. However, this is only the case at the 10% level of significance. Moreover, all other
specifications show that the estimated effect of lnWAGEit is causal.
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5 Conclusion
The wedge between private and social returns to the creation of knowledge and technology
justifies government involvement in the area of research and development. Nevertheless,
in the current environment of restoring sustainability of public finances and search for an
increasing efficiency of public policy, the question arises which policy options are most effective
in stimulating business R&D investment. This paper therefore analyses the effects of different
policies on aggregate business funded and performed R&D investment in a panel of 14 OECD
countries since 1981. Concerning traditional policy options, we find that tax incentives are
effective. Public funding (subsidization) of R&D performed by firms can also be effective if
subsidies are not too low nor too high. The optimal subsidization rate may be somewhere
between 6 and 10%. R&D performed within the government sector and within institutions of
higher education is basically neutral with respect to business R&D. We find no evidence for
crowding out nor for complementarity, which implies that each euro spent on R&D within the
government feeds through one-to-one in aggregate R&D. The higher education sector may,
however, indirectly be of great significance. This paper revealed human capital accumulation
at the tertiary level as the most important driver of business R&D investment in the OECD
during the last decades.
One of the main contributions of this paper is its attention to the impact of wage formation
on business R&D investment. Conflicting hypotheses have been introduced in the literature,
but not yet systematically analyzed. One hypothesis is that innovation and investment in
R&D benefit from low or moderate wages, since these are important for firm profitability,
which is a key condition for investment. Wage restraint is also important to convince firms
that rents from innovation will not be appropriated by the unions through higher wages.
The opposite hypothesis is that an excessive focus on wage moderation may kill incentives
to innovate. Wage moderation may for example increase the survival probability of the
least innovative firms and retard the process of creative destruction. Conversely, according
to this hypothesis, higher wage pressure may force firms to innovate as a key element in
their competitive strategy. Our empirical analysis favours the first hypothesis in fairly closed
economies and in economies with flexible labour markets. The Anglo-Saxon countries may be
the closest to this type. In highly open economies and economies with rigid labour markets,
however, rather the opposite holds and high wage pressure may encourage innovation. Many
European countries are more likely to match this type.
Our paper may also contribute to the macro R&D literature methodologically. More than
existing studies, we pay particular attention to the time series properties of the data. As most
variables in our empirical model are found to be non-stationary, we estimate a cointegrating
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relationship. Moreover, we also take into account the presence of cross-sectionally correlated
error terms, which we find to be induced by an unobserved (non-stationary) common factor
that drives business R&D spending. A sensible interpretation is that this common factor
reflects the worldwide level of technology and knowledge. To capture this, we adopt the
CCEP estimator of Pesaran (2006). We find that the standard fixed effects estimator yields
spurious results.
The policy implications of our results include a warning against excessive wage moderation
as an instrument to promote R&D investment in highly open economies with rigid labour
markets. Using insights from long-run growth theory, an appropriate guideline is that actual
real wage growth matches the rate of Harrod-neutral technical progress. Keeping real wage
growth below the rate of technical progress for an extended period of time, as more than a
few European countries have been doing during the last decades, may promote employment
in the short run, but it can also hurt the economy’s innovative capacity and productivity
in the long run. The fairly poor growth of business R&D investment in a country like the
Netherlands may illustrate this long-run disadvantage. Conversely, however, in our view our
findings provide no argument in favour of excessive wage pressure. In rigid labour markets the
loss of employment that excessive wages may cause in the short run, may persist in the longer
run due to for example hysteresis effects in bad times. If promotion of business investment
in R&D is the objective, our paper suggests better alternatives, in particular tax incentives,
well-chosen innovation subsidies and the development of high-skilled human capital.
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Appendix A Fixed effects regression results
Table 7: FE regression results
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 1.069
∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 1.080∗∗∗ 1.114∗∗∗ 1.103∗∗∗ 1.030∗∗∗ 1.058∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 1.120∗∗∗ 1.013∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.129) (0.127) (0.164) (0.167) (0.161) (0.174) (0.172) (0.175) (0.166)
lnBINDEXit 0.264
∗∗ 0.275∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗ 0.260∗∗ 0.129 0.189∗ 0.252∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.150 0.127
(0.104) (0.104) (0.106) (0.105) (0.111) (0.102) (0.107) (0.105) (0.108) (0.105)
lnSUBSit 0.243
∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
lnGOV ERDit −0.182∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.179∗∗∗ −0.183∗∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.079∗ −0.163∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ −0.216∗∗∗ −0.197∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
lnHERDit 0.528
∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.434∗∗∗ 0.481∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.060) (0.054) (0.065) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062) (0.068) (0.066)
HCAPit −0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.000 -0.008 −0.012∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
OPENit 0.002 0.028
∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.004)
lnWAGEit 0.076 0.186 −1.738∗∗∗ 0.078 1.302∗∗∗
(0.179) (0.188) (0.340) (0.179) (0.282)
PMRit 0.123 −0.456∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.076)
PMR2it −0.043∗∗
(0.018)
lnSUBSit ∗ low 0.453∗∗∗
(0.049)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.124∗∗∗
(0.031)
lnSUBSit ∗ high 0.106∗∗∗
(0.035)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.031∗∗∗
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.446∗∗∗
(0.086)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −0.689∗
(0.415)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.129
(0.228)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh 0.124
(0.124)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo −0.809∗∗
(0.410)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 0.456∗∗
(0.202)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic −0.460∗
(0.245)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -2.541 -2.635 -2.580 -2.538 -2.877 -2.909 -2.608 -2.736 -2.437 -2.589
[0.31] [0.27] [0.29] [0.31] [0.18] [0.17] [0.28] [0.23] [0.35] [0.29]
MW on ̂pcit -0.619 -1.325 -0.534 -0.492 -0.489 -1.469 -0.383 0.654 0.366 1.366
∗
[0.73] [0.91] [0.70] [0.69] [0.69] [0.93] [0.65] [0.26] [0.35] [0.09]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. For the panel cointegration test
results, the unit root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in
square brackets. The unit root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit is a MW test. The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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Appendix B CCEP results with an alternative wage indicator
based on different production function elastici-
ties
Table 8: CCEP regression results for (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and (10) for alternative
calculation of TFP and the wage gap
Dependent variable: lnBERDit
Sample period: 1981-2012, 14 OECD countries
(4’) (5’) (6’) (7’) (8’) (9’) (10’)
Coefficient estimates
Explanatory variables
lnV Ait 0.375 0.597
∗∗ 0.554∗∗ 0.395 0.655∗∗∗ 0.314 0.357
(0.249) (0.238) (0.267) (0.258) (0.230) (0.240) (0.248)
lnBINDEXit −0.171∗∗ −0.160∗ -0.093 -0.085 −0.188∗∗ −0.217∗∗∗ −0.146∗
(0.086) (0.084) (0.093) (0.092) (0.022) (0.087) (0.081)
lnSUBSit 0.002 0.029 0.031 0.034 0.049
∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
lnGOV ERDit 0.067 0.068 0.092
∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.020 0.023 0.033
(0.044) (0.044) (0.047) (0.051) (0.042) (0.053) (0.050)
lnHERDit 0.100 -0.046 0.047 0.039 0.077 -0.015 0.007
(0.068) (0.064) (0.071) (0.071) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066)
HCAPit 0.092
∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
OPENit 0.012
∗∗∗
(0.004)
lnWAGEit -0.289 0.011 −1.182∗∗∗ -0.206 0.269
(0.195) (0.186) (0.413) (0.192) (0.404)
PMRit 0.419
∗∗ -0.111
(0.198) (0.135)
PMR2it -0.045
(0.037)
lnSUBSit ∗ low -0.055
(0.076)
lnSUBSit ∗medium 0.070∗∗
(0.035)
lnSUBSit ∗ high −0.080∗∗
(0.040)
lnWAGEit ∗OPENit 0.013∗∗
(0.005)
lnWAGEit ∗ PMRit −0.308∗∗
(0.151)
lnWAGEit ∗ epllow −1.127∗∗∗
(0.391)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplmiddle 0.042
(0.432)
lnWAGEit ∗ eplhigh -0.126
(0.239)
lnWAGEit ∗ anglo -0.551
(0.413)
lnWAGEit ∗ euro 1.215∗∗∗
(0.322)
lnWAGEit ∗ nordic 0.143
(0.282)
Panic Cointegration test (one common factor)
ADF-GLS on f̂pct -0.812 -1.498 -2.043 -1.606 -2.254 -0.091 -0.289
[0.95] [0.81] [0.55] [0.77] [0.44] [0.99] [0.99]
MW on ̂pcit 1.949
∗∗ 1.423∗ 2.524∗∗∗ 2.635∗∗∗ 1.408∗ 1.757∗∗ 3.125∗∗∗
[0.03] [0.08] [0.01] [0.00] [0.08] [0.04] [0.00]
Notes: standard errors are in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. For the panel cointegration test results, the unit root test on the common factor F̂t is a ADF-GLS
test for a model with constant. The corresponding (simulated) p-values are reported in square brackets. The unit
root test on the estimated idiosyncratic errors ̂pcit for different number of common factors r=1,2 is a MW test.
The corresponding p-values are reported in square brackets
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